We analyze information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain common payoffs. Players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players. We give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, and show that information aggregates in randomly occurring exit waves. Observational learning induces the players to stay in the game longer.
Introduction
Learning in dynamic decision problems comes in two different forms. Players learn from their own individual, and often private, observations about the fundamentals of their economic environment. At the same time, they may learn by observing the behavior of other players in analogous situations. In this paper, we analyze the interplay of these two modes of learning in a timing game with pure informational externalities. We show that even though private information accumulates steadily over time, it is revealed in occasional bursts.
There are a number of examples where both forms of learning are important. Learning about the quality of a service, the profitability of a new technology, or the size of a new market are examples of this type. In all these instances, it is reasonable to assume that part of the uncertainty is common to all agents and part is idiosyncratic. Demand may be high or low. For a population of monopolistically competing firms, the market is profitable to a larger fraction of firms if demand is high. Learning from others is useful to the extent that it can be used to determine the overall demand level. It is not sufficient, however, as it may be that the product of an individual firm does not appeal to the consumers even when demand is high.
We use a standard discounted single-player experimentation model in discrete time to represent private learning. Players do not know their type at the beginning of the game.
Over time, they learn by observing signals that are correlated with their true payoff type.
We assume binary types. Good types gain in expected terms by staying in the game while bad types gain by exiting the game. We assume that information accumulates according to a particularly simple form. Good types observe a perfectly informative signal with a constant probability in each period that they stay in the game while bad types never see any signals.
1 Uninformed players become more pessimistic as time passes and the optimal strategy is to exit the game once a threshold level of pessimism is reached.
Observational learning matters if a number of players face the same decision problem and if their types are correlated. We model this correlation by assuming that there is a binary state of the world that determines the probability distribution of individual types.
In the high state, a higher fraction of the players are of the good type. Conditional on the state, the players' types are identically and independently distributed. Whenever the exit decisions of a given player are sensitive to her information, her actions reveal information about her information and hence also about the state of the world (since more players are informed in the high state). Uninformed players gain from additional information on the state, which creates an incentive to wait as in Chamley & Gale (1994) . But in contrast to Chamley & Gale (1994) , private learning prevents the players from waiting indefinitely.
Our model strikes a balance between the benefits from delaying in order to learn more from others and the costs from increased pessimism as a result of private learning.
We show that the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. In
1 The actual form of information revelation is not very important for the logic of our model. The important assumption is that it takes time for even the most pessimistic individual player to exit the game.
order to highlight the effects of learning and waiting, we eliminate the observation lags by reducing the time interval between consecutive decision moments. We show that the symmetric equilibrium can be characterized by two modes of behavior: In the flow mode, bad news from no informative signals is balanced by the good news from the observation that no other player exits. Exits are infrequent and prior to any exit, the beliefs of the uninformed players evolve smoothly.
When a player exits, the beliefs of the other players become more pessimistic. Immediate exit by all uninformed players would release so much information that an individual player might find it optimal to wait (since the cost of delay is small for frequent periods).
As a result, the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies that balance the incentives to exit and wait. If there are further exits from the market as a result of the randomization, pessimism persists, and another round of randomizations is called for. We call this phase of consecutive exits an exit wave. As soon as there is a period with no exits, a sufficient level of optimism is restored in the market and the exit wave ends. An exit wave thus ends either in a collapse of the game where the last uninformed player exits, or in a reversion to the flow mode following a period with no exits. In the symmetric equilibrium, play fluctuates randomly between these two modes until a collapse ends the game.
2
When the number of players is increased towards infinity, the pooled information on the aggregate state becomes accurate. One might conjecture that conditional on the state aggregate randomness would vanish by the law of large numbers. We show that this is not the case. Even in the case with a large number of players, transitions between the phases remain random. The size of an individual exit wave as measured by the total number of exits during the wave also remains random. Information is thus aggregated during quick random bursts. We compute the exit probabilities during exit waves and the hazard rate for their occurrence when the number of players is large.
We show that information is aggregated efficiently in the high state if there is a large number of players. By this we mean that almost all uninformed players exit in the high state as if they knew the true state. But if the state is bad, information aggregation fails:
players learn the state too late, and as a result, they delay exit. In terms of the payoffs, the message of our paper is that observational learning helps the good types while it hurts the bad types.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on herding and observational learning where 2 Examples of models that display waves of action that resemble our exit waves include Bulow & Klemperer (1994) and Toxvaerd (2008) . However, these models depend on the direct payoff externalities arising from scarcity.
players have private information about a common state variable at the beginning of the game. Early papers in this literature assumed an exogenously given order of moves for the players, e.g. Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992) , and Smith & Sorensen (2000) . A number of later papers have endogenized the timing of action choices.
Among those, the most closely related to ours is Chamley & Gale (1994) . 3 In that paper a number of privately informed players consider investing in a market of uncertain aggregate profitability. The model exhibits herding with positive probability: the players' beliefs may get trapped in a region with no investment even if the market is profitable.
In our model, private learning during the game prevents the beliefs from getting trapped.
The difference between the models is best seen by eliminating observation lags, i.e., letting period length go to zero. In Chamley and Gale, information aggregates incompletely in a single burst at the start of the game. In our model, information is revealed eventually, but at a slow rate. Caplin & Leahy (1994) and Rosenberg, Solan & Vieille (2007) consider models with private learning about common values. While these papers are close to ours in their motivation, each makes a crucial modeling assumption that leads to qualitatively different information aggregation properties to ours. Caplin and Leahy assume a continuum of players from the beginning. This assumption leads to some problems with the existence of an equilibrium and also rules out what is a key feature of our model. In our model, the actions of a large number of players result in a moderate rate of information revelation. Rosenberg, Solan & Vieille (2007) assume a finite number of players like we do, but they assume signals that may make a player so pessimistic after one period that exiting is the dominant strategy right away. As a result, when the number of players is increased, the exit behavior after the first period reveals the state by the law of large numbers. Due to these modeling assumptions, the aggregate behavior in the large game limit is essentially deterministic conditional on state both in Caplin & Leahy (1994) and Rosenberg, Solan & Vieille (2007) . Our model adds to these papers by showing that information may also aggregate slowly through randomly occurring exit waves, even when the pooled information is precise.
Another difference to the literature mentioned above is that by combining common and idiosyncratic uncertainty, our paper relaxes the assumption of perfect payoff correlation across players made in Chamley & Gale (1994) , Caplin & Leahy (1994) , and Rosenberg, Solan & Vieille (2007) . The pure common values case is obtained in our model as a special case.
3 See also a more general model Chamley (2004) . An early contribution along these lines is Mariotti (1992).
Our paper is also related to the literature on strategic experimentation. That literature focuses on the private provision of public information rather than aggregation of privately held information. Examples of such models are Bolton & Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady & Cripps (2005) . The key difference is that in those models the signals of all players are publicly observable, whereas in our model the players see only each other's actions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the discrete time model and Subsection 2.1 presents an alternative interpretation for the model as a model of irreversible investment. Section 3 describes the flow of information in the game, and Section 4 provides the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium. In Section 5, we discuss information aggregation in large games. In Section 6, we characterize the symmetric equilibrium in the continuous time limit. Section 7 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
The model is in discrete time with periods t = 0, 1, ..., ∞. The discount factor per period is δ = e −r∆ , where ∆ is the period length, and r > 0 is the pure rate of time preference.
The set of players is {1, ..., N }.
Before the game starts, nature chooses the (aggregate) state randomly from two alternatives: θ ∈ {H, L}. Let q 0 denote the common prior q 0 = Pr{θ = H}. After choosing the state, nature chooses randomly and independently the individual type for each player.
Each player is either good or bad. If θ = H, the probability of being good is ρ H , while if θ = L, the probability of being good is ρ L , where 0 ≤ ρ L < ρ H ≤ 1. In the special case, where ρ H = 1 and ρ L = 0, the players' types are perfectly correlated and the game is one of pure common values. Conditional on the state, the player types are drawn independently for all players. All types are initially unobservable to all players, but the parameters q 0 , ρ H , and ρ L are common knowledge.
The information about nature's choices arrives gradually during the game as follows.
In each period, each player receives a random signal ζ ∈ {0, 1}. Signals have two functions:
they generate payoffs and transmit information. For a bad-type player, ζ = 0 with probability 1. For a good player, Pr{ζ = 1} = λ∆, where λ is a commonly known parameter. Notice that informative signals arrive at a rate that depends linearly on the period length, and as a result, the real-time rate of information arrival is independent of the period length The signal realizations across periods and players (conditional on the state and the type) are assumed to be independent. We call the signal ζ = 1 a positive signal, since it entails a positive payoff (see next paragraph) and reveals to a player that her type is good. Each player observes only her own signals. We use the terms informed and uninformed to refer to the players' knowledge of their own type: players who have had a positive signal are informed, other players are uninformed.
At the beginning of each period t, all active players i make a binary decision a t i . They either exit, a t i = 0, or continue, a t i = 1. Exiting is costless, but irreversible: once a player exits, she becomes inactive and receives the outside option payoff 0. Hence we require that whenever a t i = 0, then a s i = 0 for all s > t. We call player i active in period t if she has stayed in the game up to that point in time. We denote by N the set of active players and we let n denote their number.
If the player continues in the game, she pays the (opportunity) cost c · ∆, observes a signal ζ ∈ {0, 1} that yields payoff ζ · v, and then moves to the next period. The cost c and the benefit v are parameters for which we assume c < λv. We also assume risk neutrality (i.e. we measure the costs and benefits in utils). The expected payoff per period is (λv − c) ∆ > 0 for a good player and −c∆ < 0 for a bad player. This means that if the players knew their types, bad types would exit immediately, and good types would never exit.
4
Within each period the players act simultaneously, but they know each others' previous actions. However, they do not observe each others' signals, and therefore they do not know whether the others are informed or uninformed.
The history of player i consists of the private history of her own signals, and the public history consisting of the actions of all the players. Since a positive signal reveals fully the player's type, the uninformed have never observed the good signal. Conditional on a good signal, it is a dominant strategy to stay in the game forever. Strategies are therefore fully described by the exit behavior of the uninformed players. For the uninformed players, all relevant information is contained in the public history of past actions, and therefore we call this public information simply the history. Formally, a history h t in period t is a sequence of actions:
Denote by H t the set of all such histories up to t and let
gives a sequence of action profiles for the entire game.
A (behavior) strategy for an uninformed player i is a mapping
that maps all histories where i is active to an exit probability. A strategy profile in the 4 In Section 7, we discuss the possibility that the value of the signal is different in the two states.
game is a vector σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ).
A player maximizes her expected discounted sum of future cash flows as estimated on the basis of her own signal history, observations of other players' behavior, and initial prior probability q 0 . By equilibrium, we mean a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the above game. In an equilibrium, all actions in the support of σ i (h t ) are best responses to σ −i for all i and for all h t .
Interpretation as an Investment Game
We can interpret the game as an investment model where a number of firms have the option of making an irreversible investment. The project qualities are correlated across firms. A good project yields c∆ > 0 per period whereas a bad project yields (c − λv) ∆ < 0 per period. The fixed investment cost is normalized to zero. Before undertaking the project, each firm learns about the quality of her individual potential project as follows.
In each period, a "failure" signal occurs with probability λ∆ if and only if the project is bad (see Décamps & Mariotti (2004) for another investment model with this kind of learning).
To see that this is equivalent to our exit game, consider the capitalized value of undertaking the action "exit" in our original model. If the player type is bad, then by exiting the player avoids the fixed cost c∆ from today to eternity. Therefore the capitalized value of exit is equal to the value of investing in a "good" project in the investment model. A "good" type in the original model avoids the cost c∆ by exiting, but at the same time she forgoes the expected payoff λv∆ per period. The net capitalized value of exit is then equal to the value of investing in a "bad" project. This shows that the two models are isomorphic (with "good" types interpreted as "bad" projects and "bad" types as "good" projects).
Beliefs
In this section we fix a strategy profile σ and describe the two different forms of learning in our model. First, as long as a player stays in the game, she receives in every period a direct signal on her type. The strength of this signal is exogenously given, and Bayesian updating resulting from such signals has been studied extensively in the literature. Subsection 3.1 below describes this private learning.
The second form of learning depends on the publicly observed actions and is endogenous in our model. Since all past exit decisions are observable to all players remaining
To make the connection to the case with learning from others, we also describe the isolated player's beliefs on the aggregate state. We let q t denote the probability that the individual player assigns on the state being H. By the law of iterated expectation,
Therefore
and as a consequence, we see that the beliefs p t and q t move tightly together.
Observational Learning
To describe observational learning in our model, we consider for the moment how player i learns from the behavior of players j = i. We denote by q i (h t ) the belief of i on the aggregate state, when learning is based only on the behavior of the other players.
Alternatively, we may think of q i (h t ) as the belief of player i as an outside observer to the game.
Recall that ξ θ j (h t ) denotes the probability with which an active player j ∈ N (h t )
and j does not exit, then Bayes' rule implies that i believes that j is more likely to be informed. As a result, i also believes that state H is relatively more likely. To describe the belief updating, we denote by A −i (h t ) the random vector containing the actions of all active players, excluding i, at history h t . The probability of a given exit vector a t −i is then:
where we use shorthand notation P θ to denote probability conditional on state:
After observing the exit vector a t −i , player i updates her belief q i (h t ) according to Bayes' rule as follows:
We denote by q i (h t ) the belief of i on the aggregate state (conditional on being uninformed). This belief differs from q i (h t ) only to the extent that the private history of i affects her belief, and therefore the relationship between the two is given by Bayes' rule as follows:
The belief of i on her own type follows now from the law of iterated expectation:
where p L t and p H t are given by (3). We end this section with two propositions that characterize learning in our model. First, we show that the likelihood of exit in state L is strictly larger than the likelihood of exit in H. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio of exit across the states is increasing over time. This guarantees that an exit is always informative about the aggregate state.
Equation (10) implies that the ex-ante likelihood ratio across states of being uninformed changes monotonically over time:
With this observation at hand, we can prove our first result on the informativeness of exits.
Proposition 1 For any strategy profile σ, we have
We give next a proposition that ranks strategy profiles according to their informativeness. For a profile σ and a history h t , we let the random variable
the posterior of player i on her own type at the beginning of period t + 1, assuming that she is uninformed at the beginning of period t. The randomness in the posterior arises from i's private signal realization and the realized exit decisions of the players other than
i. The following Proposition shows that higher exit probabilities by other players induce a mean preserving spread (in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) on the posterior.
Proposition 2 Take an arbitrary history h t with t > 0 and two strategy profiles σ and σ with σ h
Isolated Player
It is again useful to start with the case of an isolated player. The decision problem of the isolated player is to choose whether to continue or exit at period t. Standard arguments show that the problem is a Markovian optimal stopping problem with the posterior probability p = p t as the state variable. We let V m (p) denote the value function of the isolated player. Stopping at posterior p yields a payoff of 0. If the player continues, she pays the cost c∆, and gets a positive signal with probability pλ∆. In this case, the player learns that her expected payoff per period is (λv − c) · ∆, and thus the value function jumps to
Without a positive signal p falls to p t+1 according to (2). The Bellman equation for the optimal stopping problem can thus be written as:
The optimal policy is to stop as soon as p falls below a threshold level, denoted p * (∆). Standard arguments establish that value function V m (p) is increasing, convex and
We shall see that p * (∆) plays a crucial role also in the model with many players. Denote by t * (∆) the period in which p falls below p * (∆) if there is no positive signal:
We denote the optimal strategy of the isolated player by
Symmetric Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that the exit game with observational learning has a unique symmetric equilibrium. 6 Furthermore, the equilibrium value functions of the individual players can be written as functions of their belief on their own type only. With symmetric strategies all uninformed players have identical beliefs, and therefore we drop the subscripts i from the beliefs and the strategies of the uninformed players. In particular,
we let σ (h t ) denote the probability with which each uninformed player exits at history h t in symmetric equilibrium.
We start by showing that if a symmetric equilibrium exists for the stopping game, then the equilibrium value function V (h t ) is closely related to the value function of the isolated player. The key observation for this result is that as long as σ (h t ) = 0, there is no observational learning and thus the information available in the game is identical to the information available to the isolated player. On the other hand, when σ (h t ) > 0, the players can learn from each other, but their the value must be zero since they exit with a positive probability.
Lemma 1 For any symmetric equilibrium of the exit game,
Lemma 1 allows us to derive recursively the symmetric equilibrium strategy profile.
To see this, note that if the symmetric equilibrium is given for periods 0, ..., t − 1, we can calculate the beliefs of uninformed players at history h t as explained in Section 3.
Consider then exit probabilities at history h t . By Lemma 1, the payoff for the next period is given by
, and therefore, all we have to do is to find an exit probability σ (h t ) that induces a probability distribution for p (h t+1 ) that makes the players indifferent between exiting and staying. This indifference condition must equate the discounted expected value for the next period with the cost of staying for one period, so we can write it as:
where we use notation c (h t ) to denote cost of staying net of expected payoff per time unit:
The next Lemma shows that increasing the exit probabilities for the current period increases the players' incentive to stay. This result follows from two observations. First, by Proposition 2, increasing the exit probability for the current period induces a mean preserving spread for the next period belief P t+1 (h t , σ (h t )). Second, we know from Subsection 4.1 that the isolated player's value function V m is convex.
equilibria are essentially the same as in the herding models with exogenous order of moves, we do not discuss this issue further (details about asymmetric equilibria are available from authrors upon request).
Lemma 2 The expected continuation payoff EV m (P t+1 (h t ; σ (h t ))) is weakly increasing in σ (h t ). Furthermore, for each h t there is at most one exit probability σ (h t ) satisfying
Lemma 2 guarantees that for each h t , at most one exit probability makes the players indifferent between exiting and staying. However, it may not be possible to induce the players to stay in the game. The pure strategy profile σ (h t ) = [1, ..., 1] releases all information available to the players. Nevertheless, it is possible that the uninformed players are so pessimistic that even the release of all this information is not sufficient to compensate for the one-step loss of c (h t ) ∆ from waiting. When this is the case, all uninformed players exit with probability 1, and we say that the game collapses.
With these preliminaries, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1
The stopping game has a unique symmetric equilibrium where the exit probability at history h t is given by:
The symmetric equilibrium has a simple structure. Whenever the players' beliefs on their own type are above the threshold of the isolated player, i.e.
∆ and thus the equilibrium actions coincide with those prescribed by the optimal decision rule of the isolated player (i.e. stay). On the other hand, if the players are very pessimistic, then δEV m (P t+1 (h t ; 1)) < c (h t ) ∆, and again equilibrium actions coincide with the isolated player (i.e. exit with probability one). With intermediate beliefs equilibrium behavior differs from isolated player: in equilibrium the exits take place with a probability that exactly balances the players' incentives to exit and wait, whereas an isolated player would exit with probability one.
We end this section with a corollary that gives a lower bound for p (h t ) along histories where no player has exited. This will be useful in obtaining a sharper characterization of the symmetric equilibrium behavior in the limit where the time interval between successive periods is short. To see how the corollary follows from Theorem 1, note that in order to have δEV m (P t+1 (h t ; 1)) > 0, there must be a positive probability that p (h t+1 ) > p * (∆).
Since the highest possible value for p (h t+1 ) results when no player exits at history h t , it follows that whenever p (h t ) is below p * , the next period belief p (h t+1 ) is again above p * if no player exits.
Corollary 1 Consider the history h t = (1, 1, ..., 1), i.e. the history without any exits. In the symmetric equilibrium,
.
Information Aggregation in Large Games
In this section, we consider information aggregation in the symmetric equilibrium of the game as the number of players grows without bound. As a point of comparison, we use the case where the players share all information with each other. If the number of players is large and all information is pooled, then the (weak) law of large numbers implies that the players can determine the true aggregate state with arbitrarily high accuracy. Nevertheless, idiosyncratic uncertainty about player types remains: conditional on the state, each player is still uncertain about her own type. As a result, the efficient benchmark in terms of information aggregation for large games is the one where all the uninformed players know the aggregate state θ. In state θ , an uninformed player believes that she is a good type with probability p θ t . Therefore it is optimal for her to exit as soon as p θ t falls below p * (∆). We denote the efficient exit period in state θ by t * θ (∆):
The main result of this section is Theorem 2, which says that by decreasing the period length, we eliminate the possibility that a large number of players exit too early relative to this efficient benchmark. This means that for large games, information is aggregated efficiently in state θ = H because t * H (∆) is an upper bound for all exit times of the uninformed players. However, if θ = L, information aggregation fails: all players exit too late in expectation.
Since we vary the number of players N and period length ∆ while keeping all the other parameters of the model fixed, we denote by Γ (∆, N ) the game parametrized by ∆ and N . We denote by X (h t ) the number of players that exit the game at history h t in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game:
As a first step towards Theorem 2, we consider the effect of a large number of exits on the beliefs. In Proposition 1, we showed that individual exit probabilities are different across the two states, which allows the players to make inferences based on observed exits. It is therefore natural to expect that if a large number of players exit, then all the remaining players should have accurate beliefs on the aggregate state. Proposition 3
shows that this must indeed be the case with a high probability:
Proposition 3 For all ε > 0, there is some K ∈ N such that
for any game Γ (∆, N ).
A couple of remarks are in order. First, Proposition 3 holds for all strategy profiles σ (equilibrium or not) as long as some private information has been accumulated before first exits. Second, the bound K for the number of exits in the Proposition is independent of ∆ and N . By increasing N, we can make sure that the state is revealed if an arbitrarily small fraction of players exit.
Proposition 3 implies that once K players have exited and θ = H, then with a high probability, no further exits take place before t * θ (∆). This would suggest that the total number of suboptimally early exits must be bounded. However, we must also consider the possibility that an unbounded number of players exit within a single period before they learn the true state. Our second step towards Theorem 2 is to show that by reducing period length ∆, we can eliminate this possibility. This is established in Proposition 4 below.
We need some notation to keep track of the passage of real time as we vary ∆.
7 Let τ θ denote the efficient exit time corresponding to state θ in the limit ∆ → 0:
To link real time to the corresponding period of a discrete time model, we define t (τ , ∆)
as the last period before an arbitrary real time τ :
7 This notation will also be useful in the following Section where the continuous time limit of the model is considered.
Proposition 4 For all τ < τ H and ε > 0, there are constants ∆ ∈ R + and K ∈ N such that
for any game Γ (∆, N ) with ∆ < ∆.
The proof of Proposition 4 is lengthy, but the intuition is straight-forward. If the players were to adopt a strategy that induces a large number of exits with non-negligible probability within a single period, then this would generate a very informative signal about the state. For all τ < τ H , the value of such a signal is positive. If the waiting cost is low enough, then all the players would have a strict preference to observe the signal rather than exit contradicting the hypothesized positive probability of exits.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4 gives us Theorem 2, which bounds the total number of suboptimally early exits in the game. The result means that in the double limit where we increase the number of players and reduce the period length, the fraction of players that exit suboptimally early shrinks to zero, and thus, information is aggregated efficiently if θ = H. Nevertheless information aggregation fails if θ = L since in that state, the players exit too late.
Theorem 2 For all τ < τ H and ε > 0, there are constants ∆ ∈ R + and K ∈ N such that
We end this section with a remark on the restriction to the symmetric equilibrium.
Although we have assumed symmetry throughout this section, there is very little that depends on this restriction. The proof of Proposition 3 is valid for any asymmetric equilibrium strategy profile as well. The proof of Proposition 4 uses symmetry in two lemmas (Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 in the Appendix). However, even there symmetry is used for notational convenience (the number of exits within a period is binomially distributed, which leads more easily to the desired results).
Exit Waves
In this section, we characterize the symmetric equilibrium in the limit as ∆ ↓ 0. We have several reasons for this. The first reason is substantive. In a model with endogenous timing decisions, it is important to know if the results depend on an exogenously imposed reaction lag ∆. Second, it turns out that the inherent dynamics of the model are best displayed in the limit: information aggregation happens in randomly occurring bursts of sudden activity. We call these bursts of activity exit waves. Third, when we also let N → ∞, we can compute the statistical properties of the equilibrium path in an explicit form.
We may view the public history h ∞ generated by the symmetric equilibrium σ (∆, N ) in the game Γ (∆, N ) with period length ∆ and N players from a slightly different angle.
Suppose that the players are to be treated anonymously. Then the vector t (∆, N ) = (t 1 (∆, N ) , ..., t N (∆, N )) where t k (∆, N ) indicates the period in which k th exit took place gives a full account h ∞ . The profile σ (∆, N ) induces a probability distribution on R N on instants of exit measured in continuous time τ (that is, k th exit takes place at time
We denote this distribution, conditional on state, by F θ ∆,N (τ ). We investigate the limiting distribution
where the convergence is taken to be in the sense of weak convergence. Observational learning then results from the differences between F H N (τ ) and F L N (τ ). In Subsection 6.1 we keep the number of players fixed at N . We show that when there was no exit in the previous period, the proability of exit within the current period is of the order ∆. This means that exits arrive according to a well defined hazard rate, and we say that the game is in the flow mode. On the other hand, if there was an exit in the previous period, then the probability of exit in the current period is bounded away from zero, and we say that the game is in an exit wave. We also show that each exit wave ends in collapse with a strictly positive probability.
In Subsection 6.2, we consider the limiting distributions
defined on the set of sequences of exit times {τ k } ∞ k=1 . In particular, we compute the distributions for the first K exit instants and we also calculate the probability of the event that the market collapses by time instant τ , i.e. the probability of the event {τ k ≤ τ } for all k. We make use of Poisson approximations and Theorem 2 when computing the size of exit events and the probability of collapse given an exit event.
The Structure of the Symmetric Equilibrium
In this subsection, we keep the number of players N fixed. Since we are interested in the limit ∆ → 0, we parametrize the game and its histories with the period length ∆. We say that the game is in the flow mode at history h t if no players exited at history h t−1 , i.e.
if X (h t−1 ) = 0. The game is in an exit wave at history h t if X (h t−1 ) > 0. Finally, we say that the game collapses at history h t if σ (h t ) = 1. Collapse is an absorbing state: since all uninformed players exit, the game is effectively over, and π h t = 0 for all t > t.
This means that for a game with a given ∆, we have three mutually exclusive sets of histories, corresponding to flow mode, exit wave, and collapse, respectively:
In order to relate the discrete decision periods to real time instants, we define
where p * (∆) and t * (∆) are understood as the belief threshold and the exit time as defined in Section 4.1.
We start by showing that the beliefs of the uninformed players are qualitatively different in the two active modes. When the game is in the flow mode and ∆ is small, beliefs are close to p * while in an exit wave, they are bounded away from p * .
Lemma 3 i) For all ε > 0, there is a ∆ > 0 such that
ii) There is a ζ > 0 and ∆ > 0 such that
The following Proposition shows that active players also behave differently in the two modes.
Proposition 5 i) There is a κ > 0 and a ∆ > 0 such that
ii) There is a p > 0 and a ∆ > 0 such that
The first claim in the above Proposition justifies our use of the term flow mode. The flow mode comes to an end with a well-defined hazard rate. The actual computation of the equilibrium hazard rate is not hard in principle. Nevertheless, the formula will depend on the evolution of π θ (h t ) and it is not possible to give a closed-form solution for the continuous-time limit of the updating formula (9). 8 In the following subsection, we compute the explicit hazard rate in the limit as N → ∞.
The second point to note is that for all finite N, any exit wave ends in a finite number of periods. Hence the real time that an exit wave lasts is bounded from above by ∆N and vanishes as ∆ → 0. As a result, we may view the limit exit waves as (rather complicated) randomization events between the flow mode and collapse.
Finally, every exit wave results in a collapse with a strictly positive probability. Since an exit wave takes only a vanishing amount of real time, learning from own experience during the wave can be ignored. Recall that p (h t ) is a martingale, and its value in exit wave mode is bounded away from p * by part ii) of Lemma 3. Therefore, we conclude that a return to the flow mode cannot happen with probability 1. If the number of players is small, then the first exit starting a wave may in fact lead to an immediate collapse. Then the exit wave lasts only one period and ends up in collapse with probability one. If this is not the case, then a martingale argument establishes that the game must return to the flow mode with a strictly positive probability.
Exit Events in Large Games
The large game limit N → ∞ simplifies the computations for a number of reasons. First, we can use Poisson approximations of the Binomial distribution for the number of exits within each period of an exit wave. Second, conditional on the game not having collapsed, we know that π θ i (h t ) ≈ π θ t for all t, which allows us to use the continuous time limit of equation (10) to compute the conditional probabilities for the players to be uninformed.
This follows from the fact that with a large number of players, each individual player exits 8 The complication arises because this updating depends on the equilibrium randomization probabili-
with a negligible probability (until collapse). Third, we can apply Theorem 2, which says that the probability of a collapse in state θ = H before τ H vanishes as N → ∞.
Let p θ (τ ) and π θ (τ ) denote the continuous time limits of (3) and (10):
and let q * (τ ) denote the belief on aggregate state that corresponds to the critical private belief p * :
Note that q * (τ ) is strictly increasing within [τ L , τ H ] and q * (τ L ) = 0 and q * (τ H ) = 1.
We compute first the hazard rate of exits in the flow mode. In particular, assume that k players have exited the game at real times τ 1 , ..., τ k , and the game is in flow mode at real time τ .Using the fact that the likelihood ratio of exit across states is given by
, and the fact that the belief of an uninformed player must stay close to p * as long as no player exits (as required by Lemma 3), we can determine the hazard rate with which an additional player exits:
Proposition 6 In the limit N → ∞, the instantaneous hazard rate of k + 1 st exit at some τ ∈ (τ k , τ H ), conditional on the first k exit times τ 1 , ..., τ k , is given by
Since the expression (19) does not depend on τ 1 , ..., τ k , we may simply denote by ψ θ (τ ) the hazard rate with which an exit wave starts at time τ :
Every exit wave leads either to collapse or a return to flow mode. With a large number of players, it is easy to compute the probabilities with which either possibility occurs. To see this, note that conditional on the flow mode ending at τ , the posterior after the first exit is given by:
By Theorem 2, the game returns to the flow mode with a probability that converges to 1 as N → ∞ in state θ = H. Therefore, if the game collapses, q (τ +) = 0. On the other hand, we know from Lemma 3 that if the game returns to the flow mode, we have q (τ +) = q * (τ ). Let φ θ (τ ) denote the probability of collapse given an exit event at τ , conditional on state θ. The probability of collapse estimated by a player with belief q − (τ )
. Therefore, by the martingale property of belief for this player we have:
which gives
Since (19) gives the hazard rate with which an exit wave starts, and (20) gives the probability with which a given exit wave leads to collapse, we get the hazard rate of collapse by multiplying them:
Corollary 2 In the limit N → ∞, the instantaneous hazard rate of collapse at time τ ∈ (τ L , τ H ), conditional on state, and conditional on being in flow mode at τ , is:
We describe next the sequence of events within a given exit wave that takes place in real time τ . We use index s = 1, 2, ... to refer to the consequtive periods within the exit wave and S to denote the total number of periods within the wave. Let q s denote the belief in the s th period of the wave, and let X s denote the number of exits at that period.
Note that since we are considering the limit ∆ → 0, the duration of the exit wave in real time is zero. Fix a period s and the corresponding belief q s . Lemma 3 implies that we must have q s < q * (τ ). On the other hand, the same lemma implies that if s is the last period of the exit wave (that is, no player exits), then we must have q s+1 = q * (τ ).
Proposition 7 Consider period s of an exit wave taking place at time τ . As N → ∞, X θ s converges in distribution to a Poisson random variable with parameter:
If the realized number of exits is X s = k, the next period belief is:
Notice that the number of exits in the previous stage is a sufficient statistic for the individual randomization probabilities in the current stage. Hence the limiting process of beliefs on the state of the world can be though of as a non-homogenous Poisson random walk on the positive integers.
The exit event taking place at real time instant τ reverses to flow mode if there is some s such that X s = 0. The Poisson approximation formula above in equation (21), gives the probability that the exit event ends after s periods. The total number of exits at real time instant τ is given by
Conclusion
We have analyzed a stopping game, where the players base their decisions on their private information and on the behavior of other players in a similar situation. Other things equal, the ability to observe the actions of others makes the players more willing to postpone their actions. But this, in turn, reduces the informativeness of their actions, thus reducing the incentives to wait. The equilibrium balances these effects and leads to aggregate delays and randomly arriving exit waves. We showed that even when the number of players gets large, aggregate uncertainty persists in equilibrium, and information aggregates gradually until a sudden collapse leads to full revelation of the aggregate state.
We have kept the model as simple as possible in order to highlight the interplay between individual and social learning. A number of generalizations are possible. We could allow the value of a signal in aggregate state θ be v θ . In this case, the value of being informed, V θ , would also depend on the state. As long as the signals accumulate at the same rate across the two states, the analysis remains similar. The main difference compared to the current model would be in the characterization of the indifference condition of the uninformed players. In the current paper, indifference requires (in the continuous time limit) that p (τ ) = p * . In the extended model the analogous requirement would be
remain constant.
Alternatively, we could write a model where payoff signals arrive at different positive rates across the two states. While the details of the model would change a bit, the main message of the current paper would remain true in this more complicated model. Information would still be released in randomly occurring bursts of activity. In the limiting game with a large number of players, the analysis would, in fact, be almost identical to the current model. (13)). We use induction. As an induction hypothesis, assume that (22) holds for some t ≥ 0.
Using (9) and (22), we then have
On the other hand, using (3) and (10), we have:
Combining this with (23) gives us the induction step:
and therefore, the proof by induction is complete.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2]
Construct an experiment X i on Θ = {H, L} with outcomes in S X i = {0, 1}. The joint probabilities on the states and outcomes are given by the following stochastic matrix P
If we interpret the event {θ = H} as the event that the state is good and the event {s X i = 1} as the decision of player i to stay in the game. The joint probability over θ, s X i simply reflects the conditional exit probabilities given strategy σ.
Consider next another experiment Y i on Θ with outcomes in S Y i = {0, 1} and the associated stochastic matrix P
.Then we can write
where the stochastic matrix Φ is given by:
Since Φ is a stochastic matrix that is independent of θ, X i is a garbling of Y i , and therefore
Since the individual exit decisions X i are independent (conditional on the informational status of the players), the same argument as above applies for the joint experiments
where X and Y are as above and Z is an experiment with outcomes in S Z = {0, 1}. Since θ is correlated with ω, the information contained in X and Y is also information on Ω.
We interpret Z as the individual learning experiment on own type and hence the matrix of conditional probabilities for that experiment is given by P Z :
Since (X, Z) is a garbling of (Y, Z) by the argument above, we know that (Y, Z) is sufficient for (X, Z) with respect to Ω. The assertion that
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] i) Let p (h t ) be the belief of an uninformed player at h t under symmetric equilibrium σ. Compute the sequence of beliefs p s for s > t starting at p t = p (h t ) and using the private updating formula (2). Denote the optimal strategy of the isolated player starting from prior p (h t ) = p t by a m (p s ) for all s ≥ t. Since a m (p s ) is a feasible strategy for each player and since equilibrium strategy σ (h t ) is optimal by the definition of an equilibrium, we have
This implies that σ (h
But this contradicts the optimal strategy calculated for the isolated player, so we must have τ < ∞. Since exiting is in the support of the equilibrium strategy at h τ , we have
Since p (h s ) = p s , for all t ≤ s < τ , V (h s ) > 0 for some s ≥ t implies a contradiction with the optimal policy of the isolated player. Therefore
iii) Since V (h t ) = 0 whenever p (h t ) ≤ p * , and since σ (h t ) = 0 for p (h t ) > p * , the pure strategy a m (p (hIndifference requires that
where A t is the random vector of exits in period t and {A t = 1} is the event that nobody exits. Since V m (p) is strictly increasing for p > p * , there is an η > 0 such that
Hence we have:
Since the individual randomization probabilities are independent, symmetric equilibrium
where ξ N (h t ) is the individual exit probability in the game with N players after history
Since only uninformed player exit, we have
and equation (31) leads to a contradiction for small enough ∆ and the claim is established.
Corollary 1 and the above claim establish part i) of the Lemma.
ii) Let
where a t (k) is a vector of exit decisions where exactly k active players exit at history h t−1 . By Bayes' rule, we know that
By equation (12), there exists a ζ > 0 such that
By part i), for all ε > 0, there exists a ∆ > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆,
Since ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, the claim follows.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5] i) If
then there are no exits and the only learning comes from private observations. Hence there exists an η > 0 and a ∆ such that for all ∆ < ∆,
The loss from staying in the game for an additional period to an uninformed player is
Suppose to the contrary of the claim that no such κ, ∆ exist. Then there exist a sequence ∆ n → 0 and a sequence κ n → ∞
But then Bayes' rule implies that there exists an α > 0 such that conditional on no exit,
we can compute a lower bound for the expected value from stying in the game as:
Notice that V m (p * ) = 0 by smooth pasting. Since the losses are of order ∆ 2 n , and since V m (p * > 0) , we see that the gains exceed the losses contradicting the optimality of exits.
ii) Follows immediately from part ii) of the previous Lemma and Bayes' rule.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6] We define
we haveṗ
Using 2, we have along the history with no exits:
Substituting from 34 and 32 into 33 gives:
On the other hand, we have for short intervals dτ of real time
Equating 35 and 36 and using 32 and ??, we get
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 7] By Lemma 3, we have
Evaluating the limits, we have:
,
Therefore the claim follows by taking logarithms and computing the probability of no exit for each state.
The second claim is an immediate consequence of the Bayes' rule with k exits.
On the other hand, we can write the relationship between q i (h t ) and q i (h t ) by using (11):
10 In the pure common values case, where ρ H = 1, the ratio Combining (39) and (40) gives us:
From ( 
(an uninformed player must be more pessimistic than the outside observer).
Proof of Proposition 3
Our proof strategy is to follow the evolution of outside observer's belief along a filtration that samples the players' actions sequentially one player at a time. We show that this belief must converge to truth as the number of exits increases, and furthermore this implies the convergence of actual players' beliefs in the original filtration where all actions within a period are sampled simultaneously. The key step in the argument is Lemma 5 below, which implies that this belief process drifts at a high rate towards truth when sampled at the points where players exit. With this Lemma at hand, the rest of the argument is a straightforward application of Theorem A.1. of Fudenberg & Levine (1992) .
We use index s ∈ N to track the moments of observation starting from period t * (∆) in the following way. At s = 1 the action of player 1 in period t * (∆) is observed. At s = 2, the action of player 2 in period t * (∆) is observed, and so on. Once the decisions all N players in period t * (∆) have been sampled, the process moves to the next time period.
At s = N + 1 player 1's action in period t * (∆) + 1 is observed, and so on. This means that we map every s ∈ N to the corresponding period t (s) and player i (s) as follows:
Let ξ θ s denote the exit probability of player i (s) in period t (s) with equilibrium strategy profile σ (nothing in the proof requires this to be symmetric):
where we set ξ
= 0 (that is, probability of exit is zero for a player that has already exited). We use x s ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator for player i (s) exiting in period t (s):
Note that x s fully describes the public history up to period t (s) − 1, and in addition contains the actions of players 1, ..., i (s) in period t (s). We use notation h s to refer to the event defined by x s , s = 1, ..., s:
We denote by q s the belief process of the outside observer, who observes the players sequentially:
By Bayes rule, this belief evolves according to:
Note that for all s = t · N , t ∈ N, the belief q s coincides with the outside observer's belief after period t:
For all other values of s, q s is the belief of an outside observer who has observed only a subset of players in the last period.
Let X ∞ denote the total number of players that exit the game:
We define an increasing sequence of natural numbers {s (k)} X∞ k=1 as follows:
is a subset of { q s } ∞ s=1 sequence, that samples the beliefs immediately after realized exits.
Define:
In words, L k is the likelihood ratio for the event {θ = L} sampled after realized exits. It is clear that under the event {θ = H}, this process is a supermartingale. The next lemma is the key to our argument, and it states that this process is an active supermartingale, as defined in Fudenberg & Levine (1992) .
Lemma 5 There exists an η > 0 such that
Proof. Note first that
By Proposition 1 and (13), there is some γ > 0 such that
for all s ∈ N. Fix η small enough to ensure that
Write
Note that L k = L s(k) for k = 1, ..., X ∞ . Using (42) and (46), we have:
By definition of s (k), we have x s(k+1) = 1, and therefore, we have
, and using (45) and (48), we have:
Let s be the first observation point after s (k) at which L s is below 1+η 1+γ
there are no exits:
Then it follows from (49) and (45) that:
But, since L s is a super-martingale under θ = H, we have
which implies the following (using the fact that L s(k+1) is bounded from below by 0):
where the last inequality follows from (47). Combining this with (50), we note that
Lemma 5 says that L s , s ∈ N is an active supermartingale with activity η, as defined in Fudenberg & Levine (1992) . We need this property to apply Theorem A.1. of Fudenberg & Levine (1992), which we restate here for convenience:
Theorem 3 (Fudenberg and Levine) Let l 0 > 0, ε > 0, and η ∈ (0, 1) be given. For
for every active supermartingale L with L 0 = l 0 and activity η.
With these preliminaries at hand, we are ready to finish the proof of Proposition 3:
defined in (43). Note from (43) that:
We set L small enough to guarantee:
By Lemma 5, we know that L k is an active supermartingale with activity η. By Theorem 3, we can therefore set K high enough to guarantee that
Combining this with (51), we have
We have now proved the Proposition as regards equation (16). Knowing this, the part concerning equation (17) follows from Bayes' rule as follows. Define the following event:
Then, by the definition of A (K, ε), the posterior of {θ = H} conditional on reaching A (K, ε) must be between ε and 1 − ε:
Since (53) holds for any ε given large enough K, we know that P H (A (K, ε)) can be made arbitrarily small by increasing K. Therefore, for (54) to hold, also P L (A (K, ε)) must go to zero as K is increased, which implies that for any ε > 0, we can find K large enough to ensure that
Proof of Proposition 4
We work through a number of lemmas. First, we formalize an intuitive fact that whenever the probability that a large number of players exit within the current period is nonnegligible, the realized actions generate a precise signal about the state of the world. In particular, if the true state is θ = H, then the beliefs of all players must be very close to one after that period:
Lemma 6 For all ε > 0 and q > 0, there is some K ∈ N such that
whenever q (h t ) > q and t ≥ t * (∆).
Proof. Denote
Since X (h t ) is a random variable that can only take positive values, the following must hold:
By Proposition 1, we know that there is some γ > 0 such that
Consider the random variable
We have:
Consider the event
The formulas (56) - (59) imply that
and increasing K will increase µ L without bound. Hence, the result follows from Bayes' rule by considering the likelihood ratio across states of event A as K is increased.
Next, Lemma 7 bounds the probability with which a large number of players may exit within an arbitrary period. By Lemma 6, a random experiment that would induce a large number of players to exit with a non-negligible probability would be very informative on the aggregate state. Any uninformed player would like to stay in the game until τ H if she knew the state to be H. Suppose next that the probability of high state is bounded away from zero. As period length is reduced towards zero, the players would rather wait and observe the result of an informative experiment than exit immediately. Lemma 7 formalizes this argument.
Lemma 7 For all τ < τ H and q > 0, there are some K ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R + such that
whenever ∆ < ∆ and t ≤ t (τ , ∆).
Proof. Fix τ < τ H and q > 0. Lemma 6 implies that there is some φ :
such that the following implication holds for all h t , t ≤ t (τ , ∆), and q (h t ) > q:
Recall the definition (3) that denotes by p H t the belief of a player on her own type conditional on state being H. If τ < τ H , we can fix some η > 0 and ∆ > 0 such that p H t(τ ,∆)+1 > p * (∆) + η for all ∆ < ∆ . This follows directly from the continuity of p * (∆) and the definition of τ H . This means that we can choose K high enough so that
We fix a K such that (60) and (61) hold for all h t , t ≤ t (τ , ∆), for which q (h t ) > q.
Take any such history, and assume that P L (X (h t ) > K) > 1 2
. Consider next the payoff that an uninformed player would get by staying in the game with probability one at that history. We want to find a lower bound for that payoff. Since q (h t ) > q, the posterior for θ = H is bounded from below by q. By (60) and (61), 1 − φ (K) is a lower bound for the probability that p (h t+1 ) > p * (∆) + η, conditional on θ = H. Finally, V m (p * (∆) + η) > 0 is the value of the isolated player at belief p * (∆) + η. Therefore, the continuation payoff for a player that stays is bounded from below by:
We see from (62) that we guarantee V (h t ) > 0 by setting ∆ small enough and K large enough. Since then it is strictly optimal for any individual player to stay in the game, this contradicts the presumption that P L (X (h t ) > K) > 1 2
. We can thus conclude that for high enough K ∈ N and small enough ∆ ∈ R + the implication q h t > q =⇒ P L X h t > K < 1 2 holds whenever ∆ < ∆ and t ≤ t (τ , ∆).
Lemma 8 shows that if a large number or players exit within a period, then the belief of an uninformed player falls to a very low level.
Lemma 8 For all τ < τ H and q > 0, there are some K ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R + such that the following implication holds on the equilibrium path of any game Γ (∆, N ) with ∆ < ∆:
Proof. Fix τ < τ H and q > 0. By Lemma 7, fix K ∈ N and ∆ such that
whenever ∆ < ∆ , q (h t ) > q, t ≤ t (τ , ∆). Since τ < τ H , the same logic that led to (61) allows us to fix ∆ > 0 and q * < 1 such that whenever t ≤ t (τ , ∆) and ∆ < ∆ , the following implication holds q h t > q * =⇒ p h t > p * (∆) .
Define ∆ = min (∆ , ∆ ). For the rest of the proof we assume that ∆ < ∆, and we take an arbitrary history h t such that t ≤ t (τ , ∆), q (h t ) > q, and ξ H (h t ) > 0. Our goal is to find K such that that X (h t ) > K would imply q (h t+1 ) < q.
Consider the expression for the probability of k exits:
Since ξ H (h t ) < ξ L (h t ), it follows by straightforward algebra from (65) that
It then also follows that
To see why, assume the contrary. Then, we have
where the first inequality uses (66) and the presumption that (67) does not hold, whereas the second inequality follows from (63). But a probability of an event can not be greater than one, so (67) must hold.
Consider next the following expression:
By Lemma 1, we have
and therefore, we can set K high enough to ensure
Since ξ H (h t ) > 0, we know from (64) that q (h t ) < q * (otherwise no player would want to exit). Therefore, Bayesian rule and simple algebra leads to:
where the last inequality follows from (68). By (66), this means that q h t+1 X h t = k < q for any k > K, where we have set K ≡ K + K .
Finally, we state a lemma that limits the probability with which an outside observer's belief q (h t ) could ever get small values if θ = H. This result is simply a formalization of the notion that a Bayesian observer is not likely to get convinced of the untrue state.
Lemma 9 For all ε > 0, there is a q > 0 such that P H h ∞ : q h t ≤ q for some h t ∈ h ∞ < ε.
Proof. Consider the event
The posterior probability of θ = H conditional on reaching A is
by the definition of the event A. Since P L (A) ≤ 1, we have:
which can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing q.
With Lemmas 8 and 9 at hand, it is now easy to finish the proof of Proposition 4:
Since Σ t(τ ,∆)
t=0 X (h t ) ≥ K , we must have
Equations (70) and (71) mean that the probability that any player exits in [t K , ..., t (τ , ∆)] is less than
By definition of t K in (72) we know that
Finally, by (73) and Proposition 4, we can find ∆ ∈ R + and K such that
Noting that (74) holds when ∆ < ∆ and (76) holds when ∆ < ∆ , we may set K := K + K and ∆ := min (∆ , ∆ ), and combine (74) - (76) to get:
whenever ∆ < ∆.
